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The Curious Incident of the Falling
Win Rate: Individual vs System-Level
Justification and the Rule of Law
Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman*
For forty quarters starting in 1985, the plaintiff win rate in adjudicated
civil cases in federal courts fell almost continuously, from 70% to 30%,
where it remained - albeit with increased volatility - for the next
twenty years. This Essay explores the reasons for this decline and the need
for systemic explanations for the phenomenon. Approximately 60% of the
fall could be attributable to the changing makeup of the federal docket, but
that leaves 40% of the fall (that is, a win rate decline of 14 percentage
points over a ten year period) unaccounted for. We show that the most
obvious explanations for the remaining fall in the win rate and subsequent
volatility do not fit the data and assumptions about rational behavior.
Changes in system-level "outputs" of the justice system require a
justification that is consistent with rule of law values. The absence of such
an explanation for the falling win rate should be a source of concern.
Further empirical studies could help explain this mystery, but such studies
require data only in the possession of the courts themselves, or that are not
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currently systematically collected. We conclude with an explanation for
why systemic studies of the workings of the justice system are important.
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The Curious Incident of the Falling Win Rate
INTRODUCTION
Between 1985 and 1995, the plaintiff win rate in civil cases
adjudicated in federal district courts fell dramatically and consistently.
After 1995, win rates became substantially more volatile, with a much
slower downward trend re-emerging after 2000. Figure 1 graphs the
win rate, by calendar quarter of termination, from 1980 to 2017.1 The
magnitude of the win rate drop is astonishing: plaintiffs won almost
70% of the cases that were adjudicated to completion in the third
quarter of 1985, but won only about 30% of those that were
adjudicated in 2017. That is an approximately 40 percentage point
(more than 50%) decrease.
Figure 1: Plaintiff Win Rate in Adjudicated Cases, By Quarter of
Termination
Year: Qrtr
I We use the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts ("AO") Civil Terminations
dataset. The data cover all federal district court civil cases that closed between January
1, 1980 and June 30, 2017. Here and throughout this Essay, the win rate is defined as
the share of all adjudicated cases (those for which the AO's Judgment for variable codes
a win by either the plaintiff or defendant) that are won by the plaintiff. As used here,
"adjudication" is not the same as a trial; it refers to any decision rendered by a court
that ends a case (as opposed to an ending by settlement). We note that recently-filed
cases will not have been terminated by the end of the data compilation period. This
censoring problem is of little concern for most of our purposes.
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To get a sense of the significance of this drop, consider that if the
win rate had remained at its highest level from the third quarter of
1985 through the second quarter of 2017 (and nothing else had
changed), plaintiffs would have won roughly 570,000 more cases than
they actually did. One need not pick 1985 as a baseline, however. If
plaintiffs had won adjudicated cases between the second quarter of
1985 and the second quarter of 2017 at the 1995 rate, they would have
had 218,000 fewer wins than they actually did. We do not take a
position on the normative desirability of any particular win rate in this
Essay. It is enough for present purposes to point out that the change
in the win rate makes a difference both to individuals whose cases are
affected and in the aggregate.
We were astonished to uncover this phenomenon, and equally
surprised to find that almost nobody seems to have commented on it.2
This Essay is a speculative effort to explain what is driving these
changes. We find that perhaps 60% of the decline is attributable to
changes in the makeup of the federal caseload: more suits from case
types with lower win rates were filed during this ten year period. But
that still leaves the remaining 40% of the decline unexplained.
From the outset, we acknowledge a key general theme that has
emerged from the theory and empirical work on litigation over the last
twenty years: data on case outcomes (win rates, adjudication rates)
and litigation volumes cannot definitively identify the fundamental
causes of win rate movements over time. For example, under some
circumstances, observed plaintiff win rates can actually rise even if the
"decision standard" (and therefore the fraction of all filed disputes
that, if tried, would result in a plaintiff win) moves in favor of
defendants.3 And adjudication rates and win rates can move in the
same direction, or in opposite directions, depending on unobservable
background conditions.4
2 The phenomenon is mentioned in two articles by Clermont and Eisenberg, but
without analysis of the longitudinal trend or explanations for it. See Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REv.
1120, 1125 (1996); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or
Xenophobia in U.S. Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 441, 456
(2007) [hereinafter Xenophilia or Xenophobia].
3 See Jonah B. Gelbach, The Reduced Form of Litigation Models and the Plaintiffs
Win Rate 26-27 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 16-22,
2016) for a persuasive general account of the problem.
4 See Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial
and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229, 235 (1995) (finding non-monotonic
relationship between adjudication rate and plaintiff win rate in a more sophisticated
version of the Priest-Klein model of the selection of disputes for litigation).
[Vol. 52:13711374
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The limitations that we encounter as we explore different possible
reasons for the fall in the win are largely due to the lack of data
currently available to researchers. As we discuss in Part 1II, with more
detailed data, we could make progress towards identifying the
mechanism underlying the fall in the win rate - or at least do a better
job of ruling out some possibilities. For now, what we can do is
assemble such data as are available, assess the plausibility of some
competing explanations, and lay out the "stylized facts" that any good
theory must be able to explain.5
This Essay presents several empirical findings, but at bottom it
makes a fundamentally normative claim: the justice system is
obligated to explain suspicious developments in the administration of
justice at the systemic level. The courts have largely ignored system-
level changes such as the one we point to here. Yet the phenomenon
of the falling win rate raises significant jurisprudential and policy
concerns, issues a judicial system must confront because they go to
the heart of the values it espouses, especially impartiality and
predictability. It is widely recognized that a key component of the rule
of law is that the justice system provide (or at least have) reasons for
its decisions. That decisions be reasoned and reasonable is vital to
legality. 6 Reasons demonstrate that decisions are not arbitrary and are
impartial (that is, that they are the result of the application of relevant
law to relevant facts). Reasons are also thought to produce consistent
results across cases, another aspect of impartiality that enables
5 In economics, "stylized facts" are broadly-true generalizations about the world
that a good theory needs to be able to explain. We note that even though it is very
difficult to make causal inferences from selected data (such as win rates in litigated
cases), there are still some basic features of causal reasoning that remain valid. For
example, X is not a plausible cause of Y if X occurs later in time than Y. We can use
this kind of reasoning to rule-out some possible explanations for the fall in win rates.
6 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 365-72 (1978); Henry Paul Monaghan, On
Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 723
(2012) ("That judicial tribunals must act in a reasoned manner is now deeply
ingrained in our culture. On important matters, these reasons are expected to be made
publically [sic] available, and in written form."); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of
Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (stating that "reasoned response to
reasoned argument is an essential aspect of' the judicial process and citing Lon Fuller
and John Rawls for the proposition). For a more critical view, including a discussion
of when judges have reasons not to give reasons, see Mathilde Cohen, When Judges
Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 483, 496-525 (2015); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633,
653 (1995) [hereinafter Giving Reasons] (describing the legal system's tolerance for
not giving reasons, such as in jury verdicts).
2019]1 1375
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participants in the justice system to plan by giving them a basis on
which they can predict the likely outcome of future cases.
Although individualized reason-giving may be necessary for a
legitimate judicial system, we suggest that it is not sufficient. The
unstated assumption of most theorists is that if each individual case is
resolved with rectitude, the outputs of the system as a whole will
reflect that fact.7 But this assumption may be false. If individual cases
are being resolved accurately,8 parties (and their lawyers) are
responding rationally to outcomes, and the system suffers no shocks,
we would expect to see a stable win rate over the medium term, and
perhaps a win rate with limited, random volatility over the short run.
The fact that the win rate declined over many years, across so many
different case types, and in a way that is not easily explained by either
exogenous or endogenous developments using available data, suggests
the need to undertake a systematic evaluation of federal adjudication.9
As an initial step, we focus on explaining the mystery of the
dramatic fall in the plaintiff win rate from 1985 to 1995. In the first
Part of this Essay we survey the theory of win rates, the existing
empirical literature, and the relationship of our finding to this
scholarship. In the second Part, we consider possible explanations for
7 The idea that the justice system ought to be consistent in its decisions is related
to this discussion. Schauer argues that by deciding like cases alike, the courts privilege
stability and consistency. Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV.
217, 234 (2004) [hereinafter Generality of Law]; see also Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 837, 858 (1984) ("Procedural systems are supposed to treat like cases
alike; consistency is the systematic analogue to the impartiality feature demanded of
individual decisionmakers.").
8 What constitutes an "accurate" resolution is a deeper epistemological problem
than we can tackle here. We use the term to mean that the judge applies the law to the
facts of the case in a reasonable manner to reach a conclusion that is within the
acceptable range of outcomes. "An accurate result need not be a uniquely correct
result .... As long as the set of reasonable outcomes is bounded - as it must be -
any result within that set is accurate and any result outside it is inaccurate." Robert G.
Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155,
1161 (2006).
9 Although we recognize that it is very important, we set aside here the follow-up
normative question of how precisely to evaluate what reasons would validate a fall in
the win rate and what reasons would be red flags for the justice system. Reasonable
minds can differ on this question and it depends on one's theory of the justice system
more generally. For example, what if the fall in the win rate was caused by changing
judicial appointments (such as more judges appointed by Republican Presidents)
would this be more damning of the system than if the fall in the win rate was caused
by changes in the substantive law that disfavored one side of the "v," or if the fall was
caused by a decline in the quality of legal services available to plaintiffs? We cannot
have this debate without first trying to figure out some possible reasons for the fall in
the win rate, but it is an important debate to have.
[Vol. 52:13711376
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the ten-year decline in the win rate from 1985 to 1995 and the
subsequent volatility by assessing the theories against the data and
predictions about rational lawyer and judicial behavior over time. In
the third Part, we describe the additional data that would help to
resolve the curious incident we have uncovered. We conclude by
explaining the implications of our finding for the study of the justice
system more generally.
I. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
In this Part we survey the literature on win rates in both theoretical
law and economics and empirical legal studies. No extant theoretical
model yields broadly generalizable results about what drives aggregate
win rates. Nor have there been any empirical studies that attempt to
explain longitudinal changes in aggregate win rates. We describe the
significance of the scholarly literature that does exist below.
There is a substantial theoretical literature in law and economics on
the determinants of win rates at "trial" (used loosely to mean all facets
of adjudication).o The most famous contribution is probably the
Priest-Klein hypothesis, which suggests that (under a set of restrictive
assumptions) there should be a tendency towards a plaintiff win rate
of 50%.11 Whether the Priest-Klein hypothesis is valid as an empirical
matter remains disputed.' 2 But there is now widespread consensus that
as a theoretical matter, plausible models of litigation can generate
almost any outcome, depending on initial assumptions about which
10 See Abraham L. Wickelgren, Law and Economics of Settlement, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 330, 330-59 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013), for an
excellent analytic synthesis. On what should count as a "trial" for purposes of the
theory of adjudication/settlement, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials
Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 707 (2004). We use
the term adjudication to mean any case that ultimately reached a judgment (as
opposed to a case that was voluntarily dismissed, for example) regardless of the
procedural posture of the case at the time that judgment was reached.
11 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1984). This model assumes many things that the authors
themselves acknowledged are not true on the ground, such as, for example, that both
the stakes and information are symmetric. See id. at 40.
12 See Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 209, 210-12 (2014) (showing that selection effects are "partial," and thus
that the plaintiff win rate in adjudicated cases generally will change when the legal
standard changes, contra Priest and Klein's original model); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee &
Daniel Klerman, The Priest-Klein Hypotheses: Proofs and Generality, 48 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 59, 70 (2016) (offering more rigorous proof of some of the Priest-Klein
conclusions).
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party (if either) has private information and on subtle details of how
settlement bargaining is structured.1 3 It is therefore difficult to justify a
particular win rate or to evaluate the win rate as "too high" or "too
low" without considering a large number of other factors, most of
which are difficult or impossible to pin down empirically. For this
reason, in this Essay we withhold judgment on the appropriateness of
any particular win rate; we do not suggest, for example, that a win rate
of 70% or 30% is normatively desirable. Rather, we focus on
explaining the change in the win rate over time. Something (or things)
caused the win rate to change, and those things should be identified
because different potential causes implicate different concerns. If, for
example, the falling win rate is caused by new, more restrictive laws or
procedures enacted with the purpose of reducing plaintiff success, and
they have that effect, then the law is being administered as intended by
the legislators in an open and transparent manner. It may still be the
case that the results of that system are substantively unfair, in which
case the remedy is to change the laws or procedures that caused the
change. If judges became more defendant-friendly and this caused a
drop in the win rate despite existing laws, this raises a different kind
of problem. Bias in favor of one type of litigant, unmoored from legal
requirements, is inconsistent with the principles of judicial
impartiality and consistency.14
The theoretical work also teaches that there is no necessary
relationship between win rates and any other factor. For example,
suppose that for some reason judges did suddenly become more
defendant-friendly starting in 1985 and this continued for ten years.
Even if this were true, it is entirely possible that the win rate in
13 The title of Steven Shavell's short article aptly summarizes his overall
conclusion. Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 493, 495-97 (1996) (showing that in models with asymmetric
information favoring either plaintiffs or defendants the plaintiff win rate at trial can be
anything between 0 and 1, and the probability of plaintiff victory in settled cases (if
they were tried) can be either above or below the plaintiff win rate in tried cases). Or
as Wickelgren puts it: "[U]nder general conditions, settlement models cannot tell us
very much about empirical win rates in trials." Wickelgren, supra note 10, at 344. For
a definitive treatment of causal inference in litigation models, see Gelbach, supra note
3, at 13-16 (demonstrating that a "generalized Priest-Klein" model is capable of
explaining essentially any set of observed results).
14 We assume here that impartial administration of the law is a generally agreed
upon rule-of-law principle, even if sufficiently vague so that it allows for disagreement
in particular instances. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 CoLuM. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 38-41 (1997) (summarizing leading
modern accounts of the rule of law, and later in the article also disagreements in
application).
[Vol. 52:13711378
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adjudicated cases might not move in response. If all parties know that
cases have become harder for plaintiffs to win, rational plaintiffs
would bring fewer marginal cases (that is, cases with a low probability
of victory) and/or settle the cases they do bring on less-favorable
terms, leaving win rates in the cases that survive to an adjudication
largely unchanged.' 5 A pro-defendant movement in the "decision
standard" might even lower the plaintiff win rate in some plausible
circumstances.' Similarly, other possible influences on the win rate -
increases in (relative) litigation costs, or changes in the informational
advantage of one side or another, in (relative) costs of discovery, or in
the sequencing of motions - could have some effect on the win rate,
or none at all, depending on the details of the underlying settlement/
bargaining process that picks out cases for litigation. This observation
means that a good theory of why the win rate fell needs to be
sufficiently robust to withstand the observation that rational lawyers
and clients will change their behavior as they learn of changes to
judicial decision-making.
Turning from theory to empirical work, there are several
longitudinal studies of adjudication rates, but we have found no
scholarship that has considered the evolution of win rates over time.17
Marc Galanter's important work on the "Vanishing Trial" analyzed
adjudication rates from 1962 to 2002, but did not explore win rates.' 8
15 The extreme version of this kind of logic (that is, complete selection) was first
exposited by Priest and Klein in The Selection of Disputes for Litigation. See Priest &
Klein, supra note 11, at 5-6. For a more modern treatment that allows for incomplete
selection, see Klerman & Lee, supra note 12, at 209-14.
16 Gelbach, supra note 3, at 22-23 (showing that a pro-plaintiff change in the legal
rules can, by altering the mix of cases that are litigated or settled, either raise or lower
the win rate in litigated cases).
17 A partial exception is found in Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The
Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle
Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995). They show
that in the period from 1970 to 1989, plaintiffs brought more employment
discrimination claims when the economy was in recession. Id. at 431. Their
explanation is that a weak economy extended the average duration of unemployment
spells, driving up the back-pay damages that plaintiffs could collect if they prevailed in
their discrimination claims. In turn, this made plaintiffs willing to accept a smaller
chance of winning (since the amount they would win if they did prevail was greater).
These recession-induced cases were more likely to settle, but not all of them did. As a
result, both the adjudication rate and the plaintiff win rate declined (but the latter
only very slightly) when the economy weakened.
18 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459-60 (2004). For a
careful analysis of what can be learned from the AO disposition data, see Hadfield,
supra note 10, at 705 (arguing that after correcting for coding errors, trials have
2019]1 1379
University of California, Davis
More recent studies by Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin Clermont,19
Jonah Gelbach, 20 and William H.J. Hubbard 21 have attempted to
measure the effect on the adjudication rate of key Supreme Court
decisions regarding the standard for summary judgment and motions
to dismiss, but did not consider win rates. Finally, some studies of
plaintiff win rates take a narrower and/or cross-sectional approach,
and therefore do not uncover the changes we observe.22
Finding little prior scholarship that bears directly on our
observation of a falling win rate in civil cases, we now consider some
possible explanations.
II. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
There is no complete explanation for the win rate decline given the
available data. In this Part, we show that a substantial share of the
decline is attributable to changes in the makeup of the federal
caseload. Cases in the subject-matter areas which plaintiffs tend to
lose became more common over time, and certain categories of suits in
which plaintiffs often prevailed were actually eliminated. These
changes only account for part of the decline, however. 23 None of the
actually been replaced by non-trial adjudications, not settlements).
19 Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 194-99 (2014).
20 Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN.
L. REv. 369, 372 (2016).
21 William H. J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with
Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 36-37 (2013).
22 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the
Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 947, 947 (2002) (considering plaintiff win rates at the appellate level); Gillian
K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences
Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (2005) (studying win rates across different types of
litigants). Hadfield found that individual plaintiffs are more likely to have their cases
adjudicated than organizational plaintiffs. Id. at 1314. And Marc Galanter has found
that individual plaintiffs suing organizational defendants were especially likely to lose.
Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to
Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 577, 593 (2001) [hereinafter
Contract in Court]. For a theoretical take, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95, 95-97
(1974) [hereinafter Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead].
23 Note that these "explanations" are themselves subject to question: what
underlying factors led Congress to eliminate certain kinds of lawsuits; what led to the
growth of suits in areas where plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail? These are socio-
political questions. On prisoner suits, for example, see Margo Schlanger, Plata v.
Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1380 [Vol. 52:1371
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explanations for the remaining 40% of the decline fit our criteria for a
good explanation of the phenomenon, which are that the explanation
must: (1) fit the data and (2) be consistent with behavior we would
expect from rational parties.
A. Changes in the Composition of Terminated Cases
A shift in the mix of adjudicated cases away from case types where
plaintiffs usually do well (e.g., enforcing student loan obligations)
towards those in which plaintiffs rarely prevail (e.g., prisoner or civil
rights), would cause the aggregate win rate to decline. So, too, in
principle, could a geographic shift in the case mix towards circuits
where plaintiffs do less well. We would also expect to see a decline in
the win rate if there are more pro se plaintiffs as a share of total cases,
since pro se plaintiffs are assumed to fare less well than those who are
represented by counsel.24 We find that, indeed, the mix of cases can
explain some, but not all, of the win rate decline.
We can begin to get a handle on these explanations using a
regression equation in which we control for Nature of Suit,2 5 Circuit,
pro se status, and whether the plaintiff was proceeding in forma
pauperis. That is, we can look at the win rate each year after taking
account of any time-invariant effect of these factors, as well as a
quadratic time trend. We do this using the set of all adjudicated cases
(i.e., those case that are listed as "won" by one party or the other; we
165, 212-15 (2013).
24 Whether clients benefit from legal representation appears to be highly
contextual. Compare Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85. N.C. L. REV. 423 (2006) (suggesting
that in criminal trials, defendants who represent themselves do not experience higher
conviction rates than defendants who have lawyers), and D. James Greiner &
Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What
Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012)
(finding that an offer of representation did not improve outcomes for plaintiffs in
unemployment benefits cases), with D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled
Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for
the Future, 126 HARv. L. REV. 901, 908 (2013) (finding that an offer of representation
improved outcomes for defendants in eviction proceedings).
25 The filing of a complaint in federal district court is accompanied by a civil cover
sheet, filled out by the plaintiffs attorney. As part of the cover sheet, the attorney is
required to select from one of roughly 100 Nature of Suit codes (the number has
varied over the years). In a recent paper, Christina Boyd and David Hoffman have
assessed the reliability of these self-reported codes, and concluded that they are
reasonably accurate for some types of suits, but not for others. See Christina L. Boyd
& David A. Hoffman, The Use and Reliability of Federal Nature of Suit Codes, 2017
MICH. ST. L. REv. 997, 997-98 (2018).
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exclude cases that terminated without a win, which we can call
"settled"), and a simple linear probability model in which the
dependent variable is 1 if the case was won by the plaintiff (0
otherwise).
The exact specification, estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, is:
PWini = a + 3jYearij + fl2cCircuitic + 83 jurisdictiona + /AnNOSin +
/35Pro Sei + fl6 FPi + f 7Term-Quarti + f 7Term-Quart + si,
where:
PWini = 1 if plaintiff wins (0 if defendant wins)
Year, = 1 if year =j (1980-2016, omitting 1980), 0 otherwise
Circuitc = 1 if Circuit = c.
Jurisdiction = 1 if basis of jurisdiction = I (U.S. Plaintiff, U.S.
Defendant, Diversity, omitting Federal Question)
NOSn = 1 if Nature of Suit = n (108 narrow Nature of Suit
Categories)
Pro Se = 1 if plaintiff is pro se
IFP = 1 if Plaintiff is proceeding informa pauperis
Term-Quart = Elapsed Quarters since January 1, 1980
Term-Quart2 = (Elapsed Quarters since January 1, 1980)2 and
&i = random error term.
Figure 2 shows the estimated year coefficients (#js) from this
regression. Each point represents the effect of being in Year X (as
opposed to 1980), controlling for the factors listed above. That is, each
point plots our estimate of the "pure" effect of the passage of time
since 1980, after removing any influence on the win rate attributable
to time-invariant fixed-effects of Nature of Suit categories, Circuits, or
pro se status and any linear or quadratic time trends. The dashed lines
are upper and lower 95% confidence intervals.
[Vol. 52:13711382
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The overall pattern in these data is strikingly similar to the
unadjusted data in Figure 1: a rise between 1980 and 1985, a sharp
decline for ten years, and little secular change (albeit with
considerable volatility) between 1995 and 2016.26
The problem is that this regression only controls for the time-
invariant effects of the independent variables, and we want to know
how changes over time in the distribution of adjudicated cases across
Nature of Suit types has affected the win rate. That is, did the
aggregate win rate fall because of declines in the volume of
adjudications in high win-rate suit types, or was there a drop in the
win rate holding the distribution of suit types constant (or some
combination of the two)?
The quantitatively-inclined reader will recognize that sorting out the
relative importance of shifting litigation patterns versus changing win
rates for each suit-type is a classic index number problem. The overall
wmn rate mn any period is just the weighted average of the win rate for
each suit type, with the weights given by the number of suits in each
26 The AO did not track pro se status until 1995, so the control for pro se status is
only meaningful after that date.
University of California, Davis
category. Over time, however, both the win rates for each suit type
and the volume of adjudications in each type can and do change. How,
then, to decompose the change in the overall win rate between
changes in weights (volume of cases adjudicated) and suit-type win
rates? Unfortunately, as is well known, there is no perfect solution to
this problem. 27 When both quantity weights and win rates are moving
around substantially (as here), there is no unique formulation that
best captures changes in the overall win rate over time.
One plausible solution is the Walsh Index, which we use here.28
Define:
Wt = value of win rate index in quarter t,
nit = number of suits adjudicated in Nature of Suit category i in
quarter t, and
wit = wm rate in Nature of Suit category i in quarter t.
If we choose the third quarter of 1984 as our (arbitrary) base period,
quarter 0, then Wo is automatically assigned a value of 1.0, and the
value of W in quarter t is given by:
W = Z(wit ) 29
Wt thus measures the win rate in period t relative to its baseline
value, Wo. Using the data in the Appendix for the twenty-eight largest
Nature of Suit categories (in 1985),30 Figure 3 plots the value of the
win rate index for each quarter between 1980:1 and 2017:2.
27 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, DEVELOPING A REVISED MANUAL FOR THE PPI 370-
71 (2005), https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sta/tegppi/chl5.pdf (discussing basic
index number theory in chapter 15). In macroeconomics, the index number problem
notably occurs in computing the rate of change of the overall price level ("inflation").
Here, Nature of Suit level win rates are analogous to "prices" and volume of suits
adjudicated are analogous to "quantities of goods sold."
28 See J.F. KENNEY & E.S. KEEPING, MATHEMATICS OF STATISTICS 66 (3d ed. 1962).
The Walsh Index is one solution among many.
29 The quantity weights used here are the geometric mean of the period-zero and
period-t quantities. The choice of base period is arbitrary, since the index value only
measures win rates in quarter t relative to whatever base period is chosen.
30 Together, these suit types accounted for 89,000 (92%) of the 97,000
adjudications in that year. Using the sixty largest Nature of Suit categories gives an
identical result, since the remaining categories include too few litigated cases to make
a difference in the overall calculation. See infra APPENDIX, for the raw quantities, win
rates, and the abbreviation key.
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The win rate index looks very similar to the overall win rate in
Figure 1. From its value of 100 in the fourth quarter of 1980, the
index fell to just under eighty in the fourth quarter of 1995. Over the
next twenty-two years, there was little or no trend in the index:
although it was highly volatile, its average value remained at about
eighty. That means that a plausible estimate of the "pure" win rate
decline - apart from any reallocation of litigated cases across Nature
of Suit types during the 1984-2016 period - is about (1 - 0.8) = 20%.
Starting from a win rate of 70%, the decrease is thus about 14
percentage points (or 0.2 X 0.7 = 0.14). That is 40% (1 4 /35ths) of the
total drop in the win rate between 1985 and 2016 of 35 percentage
points, with the remaining 60% of the drop being explained by
reallocation of cases across Nature of Suit categories.
Figure 4 further disaggregates these results to clarify the underlying
patterns. It plots the percentage change in the win rate against the
percentage change in the volume of adjudications between 1985 and
2016 for each of the twenty-eight largest Nature of Suit categories in
1985.31 The key conclusion is that both win rates and adjudication
volumes fell across a wide range of cases: most of the observations are
31 See infra APPENDIX, for the raw quantities, win rates, and the abbreviation key.
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located in the southwest quadrant, where both win rates and
adjudication volumes declined.
Figure 4: Percent Change in Plaintiff Win Rate vs Percent Change in
Adjudication Volume 1985-2017: by Nature of Suit (for 28 Largest
Nature of Suit Categories in 1985).
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Only three of the twenty-eight Nature of Suit categories (11%) had a
higher win rate in 2016 than in 1985.32 Win rates declined for, among
others, Copyright, Medical Malpractice, Motor Vehicle Personal
Injury, Contract, Bankruptcy, and Insurance cases, as well as most
Prisoner and Civil Rights cases. All of these cases moved in the same
direction, albeit at different rates. The fact that these case types have
virtually nothing in common suggests that some broader factor (or
factors) must have been at work. The pattern cannot be explained with
reference to doctrinal developments in any particular set of cases
because it is consistent across all case types despite different doctrinal
developments in the substantive law.
The period between 1985 and 1995 also saw a drop in adjudication
volumes overall, and for several case types in particular. Only seven of
32 There may be a doctrinal explanation for some of the positive change in tax
cases, which is a change in the burden of proof in 1998. See Bryan T. Camp, Tax
Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 55-58 (2004) (discussing
changes to the burden of proof in 1998).
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the twenty-eight Nature of Suit categories experienced an increase in
the volume of adjudications, and many categories experienced sharp
declines. Chief among these was Overpayment of Veterans Benefits,
which accounted for by far the largest number of adjudications in
1985, amounting by itself to more than 25% of the total. This category
had essentially vanished by 1994.33 Since the government won almost
every Veterans Benefits Overpayment case it brought, that drop in
litigation volume was highly consequential for the overall win rate.
In sum, the drop in the overall win rate is in part the result of a
reallocation of adjudications in favor of those Nature of Suit types
where plaintiffs do less well, and in part the result of a reallocation of
work between the judicial and administrative branches. There was a
substantial fall in the volume of adjudicated cases in some Nature of
Suit categories with high win rates (e.g., Veterans Benefits
Overpayments). To a much smaller degree, there was a rise in
adjudications in categories with low win rates (e.g., Prisoner Habeas
and Prisoner Vacate Sentence). On the other hand, win rates fell for
many of the narrowly defined Nature of Suit classifications, and our
calculations suggest a 20% drop in the "pure" win rate. We now turn
to explanations for this drop that might fit the data and be consistent
with rational lawyer behavior.
B. Selection Effects
The 20 percentage point pure win rate drop might be explained by
changes in the mix of cases being adjudicated over time. Suppose there
are two kinds of cases, those likely to win ("good") and those unlikely
to win ("poor"). The declining win rate may be due to: (1) plaintiffs
filing more "poor" cases, (2) plaintiffs litigating more "poor" cases, or
(3) selective settlement of winning cases that would previously have
been litigated.
Unfortunately, all of these possible explanations are more-or-less
consistent with plausible models of litigation behavior, and are
essentially indistinguishable given the data we have. Even worse,
many paradoxical results are also possible under reasonable models of
litigation and settlement: for example, under some circumstances, the
33 The explanation for this drop-off is that Congress passed a law in 1988 creating
a new tribunal for veterans' appeals - after claims go through that tribunal, appeal is
to the circuit courts rather than to district courts. See generally Veterans' Benefits
Improvement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105. At their peak in 1985,
there were 46,321 suits contesting overpayment of veterans' benefits; that number fell
to 634 in 1994 and fell into the single digits by 2004.
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plaintiff win rate in adjudicated cases could fall even if the average
"quality" of filed cases actually rose.34 Nevertheless, we think it is
worth looking at the raw data to see what patterns can be discerned.
Even if we cannot identify the source or cause of the falling win rate,
we can at least put on the table the basic facts that a compelling theory
must be able to explain.
1. "Poorer" Cases Being Filed?
Perhaps the win rate drop reflects a fall in the "quality" of cases that
are initially filed. Could it be that for ten years, starting in 1985,
plaintiffs brought increasingly less-meritorious lawsuits, and the drop
in the win rate is simply the result of worse cases being brought?
We find that story unconvincing, for several reasons. First, it is far
from clear as a matter of theory that a fall in the average quality of
filed cases would lead to a drop in the win rate: some or all of those
new low-quality cases might settle out, leaving the ultimate win rate
unchanged, or nearly so.3 And it is even possible that a worsening
(leftward shift) in the distribution of suit quality could raise plaintiff
win rates.
Second, it is unclear why plaintiffs or their lawyers would start
bringing worse cases in 1985, continue doing so for thirty of the next
forty calendar quarters, and then rather abruptly stop. The steady fall
and sudden leveling off in win rates seems incompatible with any
larger socio-legal trend, and the length of the decline is hard to square
with rational behavior. As poorer cases start to lose, one would
imagine that attorneys would start vetting cases more carefully,
pushing-back against the deterioration in quality by becoming more
choosey in the cases they are willing to take. There may be some delay
in lawyers figuring out the changing landscape, but it seems hard to
believe that it would take ten years for a new equilibrium to be
reached. 36
34 For a fuller explanation, see Gelbach, supra note 3, at 22-23 (illustrating how a
rise in the overall "quality" of suits filed could nevertheless be consistent with a fall in
the plaintiff win rate in litigated cases).
35 Selection would probably work to attenuate the effects of a decline in suit
quality. Cf. Klerman & Lee, supra note 12; Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 17. It is
even possible that a fall in (leftward shift in the distribution of) case quality could
actually raise win rates in adjudicated cases under some circumstances. See Gelbach,
supra note 3, at 23-25.
36 Studies of contingency fee lawyers, for example, show that they diversify their
portfolios of cases at different levels of risk. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS,
REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
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Third, as Figure 5 illustrates, the total volume of filed cases was
trending downward during the 1985 to 1995 period. If more "poor"
cases were being brought at the same time that total filings fell,
plaintiffs would have had to bring fewer "good" cases at the same time
that they filed more "poor" ones, which seems implausible. Even if
plaintiffs had a reason to bring more "poor" cases, it is very difficult to
imagine why they would also simultaneously have had a reason to
bring fewer "good" ones.
Figure 5: Volume of Cases, by Quarter of Filing: 1980-201637
Year Qrtr
Censored Date: inct only cases terminated by Jun. 30, '17
Still, it is possible that the ratio of "good" to "bad" cases has
changed over time and that this partially explains the change in the
win rate in conjunction with other factors. In Part III we consider
possible causes for such a change and how they might be studied
further.
11-12 (2004). Given their business model, we predict they would be especially
sensitive to changes in the win rate in their vetting and settlement practices. Yet we
find a decline in the-win rate of tort cases, which are most likely to be taken on a
contingency fee.
37 Note that because the data include terminated cases only, recent filings that did
not have time to close before the data were compiled are excluded, making it appear
as if the volume of filings dramatically decreased in the last year. Instead, what
occurred was simply that the volume of closed filings declined.
2019] 1389
University of California, Davis
2. "Poorer" Cases Being Litigated: More Aggressive Defendants or
More Optimistic Plaintiffs?
Perhaps the falling win rate reflected a growing willingness by
defendants to adjudicate "poor" cases that they had previously
settled,3 8 or a growing - but mistaken - optimism on the part of
plaintiffs about their chances of success. Either story could
conceivably explain why the group of cases that do not settle came to
contain a larger fraction of plaintiff losses over time. Unfortunately,
both seem at odds with expected behavior and the scant factual
evidence.
For one thing, both scenarios are subject to the same question-
begging problem as the filing story we discussed earlier. It is hard to
know what could have caused defendants across substantive areas to
begin altering their litigation strategy over a period of ten years
starting in 1985. What change in the background rules or culture
could explain such a new strategy? We are unaware of any changes in
law, or in other factors such as litigation costs, that might predict such
a large and consistent increase in defendants' willingness to go to trial
in cases they would previously have settled.39 The same is true for
plaintiffs - why would they have started to adjudicate more "poor"
cases that they formerly would have agreed to settle in 1985, and then
abruptly stop doing so in 1995?
Moreover, both accounts are in tension with the minimal evidence
on adjudication rates. If defendants started playing tough (or plaintiffs
became irrationally exuberant), the adjudication rate - the share of
all terminated cases that are adjudicated (won by either party, as
opposed to settling) - should have risen. Instead, as figure 6
illustrates, the opposite is true.
38 See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, To Curb Suits, City Now Opts to Fight Them, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/nyregion/new-york-to-
stem-civil-rights-suits-is-now-reluctant-to-settle.html (documenting new litigation
strategy under which New York City announced that it would start to defend what it
deemed were non-meritorious lawsuits that it had previously settled because the suits
cost more to defend than the amount at stake). This is only a single defendant, and it
occurred very late in the period covered by our data. However, we have heard
anecdotally that insurers developed more sophisticated settlement strategies around
1980. We discuss the possibility that more "good" cases were being selected out for
settlement in the next section.
39 Other scholars have noted, however, that there was a change in the makeup and
general ethos of the judiciary during the 1970s. We discuss this below.
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Figure 6: Adjudication Rate: 1980-2017
CY
Year: Qrtr
Measured either as the "raw" rate or after controlling for Nature of
Suit, Circuit, and pro se and in forma pauperis status, the adjudication
rate has fallen steadily since 1980.40 To explain both a falling
adjudication rate and an increased proportion of plaintiff losses, there
would have to be both a rise in the volume of "poor" cases reaching
adjudication, and a drop in the number of "good" cases as well.41 This
40 As with Figure 2, Figure 6 shows the "year effect" (here, on the adjudication
rate), again controlling for Nature of Suit, Circuit, pro se and informa pauperis status.
The specification is exactly as for Figure 2, except that the dependent variable is one if
the case is won by Plaintiff, Defendant, or "Both," and the regression is estimated over
all terminated cases (not just those won by Plaintiff or Defendant or Both).
41 See Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 234-35 (deriving a relationship between the win
rate and adjudication rate (across nature of suit types) in the Priest-Klein model).
Unfortunately, the relationship depends on the (unobservable) location of the
decision standard relative to the (unobservable) distribution of suit "quality" among
all disputes. When the decision standard is below the mean of the suit quality
distribution, an increasing adjudication rate lowers the plaintiff win rate. When the
decision standard is above the mean of the suit quality distribution, a higher
adjudication rate raises the win rate. Thus, one explanation for how the win rate and
the adjudication rate could both fall over time is if the decision standard is high
relative to the quality of the cases being brought and moves higher (in a direction
more favorable to defendants) over time.
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is possible if post-filing selection effects are very large. We now turn to
our attempt to test the selection effect hypothesis.
3. Case Selection and Pretrial Dispositive Motions?
The decline in plaintiff win rates might be attributed, at least in part,
to an increase in selective settlement. For example, suppose
defendants became better at figuring out which cases plaintiffs were
going to win. That would allow defendants to settle the cases most
favorable to plaintiffs, leaving only the "poor" cases to proceed to an
adjudication and lowering the win rate. In this view, the win rate fell
because the best cases were taken out of the process in greater
numbers than formerly, so more plaintiff "wins" were moved off-stage
and did not show up among the cases terminating in a judicial
decision.42 Figure 6 shows that the adjudication rate was indeed falling
over the period as a whole - a higher proportion of cases were
settling rather than resolved by a judicial intervention - which is
consistent with this story, at least in part. And the story is also
consistent with developments in the court system, such as the 1983
revisions to Rule 16, which explicitly encouraged settlement as part of
case management, and the passage of the 1990 Civil Justice Reform
Act, which encouraged experimentation with Alternative Dispute
Resolution ("ADR") in the federal courts.43
This story is appealing, but the existing evidence does not
adequately support it for three reasons. First, the case selection story
does not fit the data. As we observed earlier, it is hard to see how the
selection effect is reconcilable with the timing of the change in the win
rate. Why would selective settlement suddenly begin in the mid-
1980s, continue for ten years, and then shift to a more volatile but
narrower range? And how is the trend in the adjudication rate -
which drops more-or-less steadily from 1980 through 2016 -
consistent with the quite different trend(s) in the win rate, which
42 Of course, it might be that plaintiffs are settling-out winning cases on less-
favorable terms - net of trial costs - than they would have obtained if they had
litigated the cases to an adjudicated outcome, but there is no way to know whether
this is true.
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 16; David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and
Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1984-87 (1989) (describing the 1983
amendment to Rule 16); DONNA J. STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A STUDY OF THE
FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1990: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND
CASE MANAGEMENT 1 (1997), https://www.fjc.gov/content/study-five-demonstration-
programs-established-under-civil-justice-reform-act-1990-report-0.
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declines dramatically only between 1985 and 1995? If worse cases
were being selected for adjudication, we would expect to see a decline
in the win rate that better tracked the decline in the adjudication rate.
Finally, how does the selective settlement story fit with the increased
volatility in the win rate we see in the period after 1995? We can think
of no theory of rational attorney behavior that would explain this
pattern. In other words, the selection story more or less fits the trend
observed from 1985 to 1995, but not before or after.
Second, any change in settlement practice capable of explaining the
win rate decline would have to be asymmetric in some dimension. If
both sides became better at predicting adjudicated outcomes, we might
expect fewer litigated cases, but no change in the success rate of the
cases that make it to an adjudication.44 It is not obvious why selective
settlement - even if it occurred - should have favored defendants.
So, for example, an increase in the availability of ADR techniques
cannot explain the falling win rate unless it is coupled with a story
about why ADR should disproportionately screen out the cases that
plaintiffs would formerly have won.
One such explanation might be an increased use of pretrial motions
that end the suit. It is reasonable to assume that defendants are the
source of most of the dispositive pretrial motions.4 5 That means that
when the defendant prevails on his motion, the case ends in an
adjudication. But the plaintiff can, at best, only "survive" such a
motion. If the defendant loses, the result is that the case moves
forward, although it may settle if the adjudication has provided
-4 It might be the case that changes in parties' information were asymmetric across
case types, rather than between plaintiffs and defendants for a given case type. For
example, an improvement in information for case types in which plaintiffs had high
win rates (but not for those in which plaintiffs had low win rates) might cause a fall in
the overall win rate. Cf. Waldfogel, supra note 4. The problem for that explanation,
however, is that win rates declined across a wide range of case types that had few if
any structural similarities and included those with initially high and low plaintiff win
rates. It is hard to see what forces could have led to a change in information structures
consistent with these observations.
45 This is certainly true of motions to dismiss. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Voluntary dismissals are coded differently from adjudications on a motion to dismiss.
In other work we have found that approximately 60% of summary judgment motions
are brought by defendants. Miguel de Figueiredo et al., Against Judicial
Accountability: Evidence from the Six Month List 63 (Feb. 20, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors). Cecil et al. find that 72% of summary judgment
motions were filed by defendants. See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary
Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 886
(2007).
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information that spurs settlement.4 6 Over the span of cases, one would
predict that an increase in dispositive pretrial motion practice (such as
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment) would likely
decrease the plaintiff win rate in the cases that are adjudicated. To see
why, assume that some fraction of the cases in which plaintiffs survive
a motion would otherwise have been plaintiff wins at trial. If these
motions made cases more likely to settle because the process of
bringing and deciding the motion revealed information helpful to the
parties' negotiation (or increased costs, or both), then the plaintiff win
rate would decline.47
At the same time, however, this theory also predicts an increase in
the adjudication rate because some of the additional motions should
resolve the dispute. But this prediction is not borne out by the data.
Because both defendant wins in dispositive motions and all trials are
counted as adjudications, introducing pretrial motions should raise
the adjudication rate as some of these additional motions will be
decided and end the lawsuit. To be sure, pretrial motions decrease the
number of trials, but since trials were relatively rare to begin with and
pretrial motions are more common, the volume of pretrial motions
adjudicated to a defendant win will more than offset the decrease in
trials, resulting in a higher adjudication rate overall.
It is impossible to test for this kind of selection directly, especially
with the limited information available in the AO dataset.48 But we can
at least look at whether the degree of selection is related to the plaintiff
win rate among the cases that survive settlement. If the selective
settlement story is correct, as more cases are selected out for
settlement, the win rate should drop. Likewise, in the group of cases
where the adjudication rate is higher (meaning fewer cases are selected
out for settlement), the win rate should rise.
To test this explanation, we first compute the share of all cases filed
in quarter t and case-type n that ultimately reach an adjudicated
outcome. That is, we define a quarter-and-case-type-specific
adjudication rate, ADJtn, and then plot this variable against probability
46 For example, Boyd & Hoffman find that motion outcomes affect speed of
settlement, but they study only a narrow set of cases in the federal courts. Christina L.
Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, 29 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 898,
900 (2012).
47 The win rate analysis follows that of Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein,
Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 110-11, 113-14 (1990).
48 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia, supra note 2, at 452-53
(describing the AO dataset).
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that plaintiffs will win the cases from this group that are ultimately
adjudicated.4 9
To see how this might work, consider a hypothetical group of cases
of Nature of Suit type n filed in quarter t. For example, suppose we
find 100 Employment Civil Rights cases filed in the third quarter of
1984. Of these, eighty are settled and twenty are adjudicated: ADJn =
20%. Plaintiffs ultimately win eight of the twenty cases that are
adjudicated, for a win rate of 40%. In the fourth quarter of 1990,
ninety Employment Civil Rights cases are filed. Sixty-eight of these
settle and twenty-two are adjudicated (24.4%). Plaintiffs win twelve of
the litigated cases, for a win rate of 54.5%. In this canned example, the
less selection there is from among the filed cases, the higher the
plaintiff win rate for those cases that are adjudicated. This negative
relationship between adjudication rate and win rate is what the
Issacharoff and Loewenstein theory predicts (although unfortunately,
more complex theories of adjudication are also consistent with the
opposite result under some circumstances).50
Figure 7 plots the quarterly adjudication rate against the plaintiff
win rate for each of the twenty-seven largest Nature of Suit categories.
(Each observation is the adjudication rate and win rate for cases in
case type t filed in quarter n.)
49 The t subscript indexes the quarter in which the case was filed, while the n
subscript indexes the Nature of Suit code for that case. Note that we sort cases by
filing date, rather than termination date as in the rest of this Essay.
SO See Waldfogel, supra note 4.
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Figure 7: Quarterly Adjudication Rates vs Win Rates by Filing
Quarter, for 27 Largest Nature of Suit Categories: 1980:I-2015:IV
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Figure 7 reveals two interesting facts. First, for virtually all case types,
the adjudication rate and plaintiff win rate are positively related: in
quarters where the adjudication rate is higher, the plaintiff win rate for
those cases that survive to reach an adjudicated outcome also tends to
be higher. While there are a few case types (Social Security/SSID;
Disability; Other Personal Injury: Asbestos) for which there is no
apparent relationship between adjudication rates and win rates, there
are no clear examples of the hypothesized negative relationship
between these two variables. This is consistent with, but does not
prove, the selection hypothesis.
Second, it is also apparent that for most case types, win rates are
considerably more variable than are adjudication rates, as is the case,
for example, with Motor Vehicle Personal Injuries. 5 1 That is
surprising, since any theory in the Priest-Klein tradition would
generate the conclusion that "outliers" (clear wins for plaintiffs or
defendants) would be the cases most likely to settle, leaving the win
rate less volatile than the adjudication rate by virtue of this "sieving"
51 There are a few clear exceptions in which win rates are virtually constant and it
is instead adjudication rates that are quite variable. Student Loans, Veterans Benefits,
Prisoner Civil Rights, and Prisoner Habeas all have essentially constant plaintiff win
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process. In the limit, the Priest-Klein model predicts a constant win
rate of 50%; Klerman and Lee's model of partial selection attenuates
the 50% prediction but still suggests that win rates should be insulated
from changes in the quality of filed cases via selective settlement.
We are not entirely sure what to make of this evidence. On the one
hand, it is consistent with a selection effect in some categories of cases.
On the other, in some case types we most expected to have a strong
positive relationship between the adjudication rate and the win rate
(that is, a strong selection effect) such as "other personal injury," we do
not find any relationship between the adjudication rate and the win rate.
C. Changes in Litigant Identity
It is possible that litigant identity changed over time, putting
plaintiffs at a disadvantage which in turn lowered their win rate.
"Plaintiff" and "defendant" are legal categories, not sociological ones.
A plaintiff can be an individual or an institution, rich or poor. Perhaps
sociological changes in who was bringing suit in the years we study
explains the change in the win rate. As two prominent theorists have
noted: "The skilled strategist knows that one can no more predict the
outcome of a case from the facts and the law than one can predict the
outcome of a game of chess from the positions of the pieces and the
rules of the game. In either case, one needs to know who is playing."52
(That includes what resources they have, what constraints they face,
and what they believe about how the system works.)
The dynamic of litigation is likely different when individuals sue
institutions than when adversaries are more equal. For example, it has
been suggested that individuals are likely to have fewer resources and
therefore may be more likely to lose lawsuits than institutions because
they are unable to invest sufficient resources in prosecuting their case.
Information asymmetries may play a larger role as well. And the stakes
in litigation are almost certainly different between repeat players and
one-shot litigants.53 In sum, litigation may be more of an "uphill
battle" for individuals than for institutions, even in meritorious cases,
affecting the win rate.54
52 Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE
L.J. 1405, 1472 (2000).
53 Priest & Klein, supra note 11, at 28-29. See generally Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead, supra note 22.
54 See generally Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and
Its Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1387-98 (2006). For specific evidence, see Galanter,
Contract in Court, supra note 22, at 599-601.
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Unfortunately, existing data do not track litigant type so we cannot
falsify this theory.55 We do find some evidence supporting it, however.
For example, the falling success rate for cases brought against the U.S.
Government is part of what drove the drop in overall win rates, as
illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 below. That segment of cases is too small
to explain the entirety of the win rate decline, even in combination
with the changes in case type. Still, the U.S. Government is a powerful
institution and increasing losses in cases against it, as compared to
other jurisdictional categories, leads us to suspect that changes in
litigant identities may be driving the "pure" win rate decline, at least
in part. We also find limited support in the fact that there was no
decline in the win rate in cases brought by the U.S. Government.
Perhaps being a powerful institution explains its consistent win rate,
although it is equally plausible that this success was due to case
selection.
We also find that plaintiffs tend to lose earlier in litigation than
formerly, and when they do win, plaintiffs wait longer to succeed, as
illustrated in figures 10 and 11 below. Together, these changes are
consistent with a story that plaintiffs were increasingly more likely to
be individuals who faced an uphill battle in winning against
institutional adversaries. Changes to the procedural law, discussed in
Section F, combined with an increased number of individual plaintiffs
may also have contributed to the decline in plaintiff success.
It is difficult to separate individual litigants from the quality of legal
representation they are able to obtain and the effect of legal
representation on outcomes. Individuals who have fewer resources are
likely to have access to a different segment of the market for legal
services than institutions do. This, in turn, may impact plaintiff win
rates. For example, suppose an individual hires a lawyer whose
business is based on volume. Such a lawyer may abandon or fail to
zealously pursue her relatively low value case if she cannot get a
settlement quickly, even if the case has merit. It has been documented
that "settlement mill" firms do a poor job of distinguishing between
meritorious and non-meritorious cases. 56 The result may be a
55 A valiant effort to determine what proportion of cases are brought by
individuals as opposed to institutional litigants can be found in Hadfield, supra note
22, at 1294-1305. The study is not longitudinal. Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers,
Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 L.
& Soc. INQUIRY 497, 497 (1996) focuses only on the largest firms.
56 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1485, 1536-37 (2009). As the name implies, however, such firms settle cases for the
most part rather than adjudicating them.
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dismissal for want of prosecution or a loss on a dispositive motion that
the plaintiff might have won if the lawyer was willing to invest more
in the case or was just a better lawyer.5 7
Our analysis so far has assumed that rational lawyers have a
financial incentive to vet cases before filing and therefore that they
would react to a fall in the win rate by improving their vetting process.
But if the market for legal services encouraged a growth in the number
of lawyers who do not vet cases or are unable to do so effectively, then
we might expect to see a decrease in the win rate.58 The "settlement
mill" firm may file many more cases that are likely to lose if they
invest very little in them and can settle enough cases for a going rate
that large numbers of losses do not affect their behavior.5 9 In other
words, if there is a business model for lawyers which rewards reduced
investment in vetting cases, and there is a rise of filings from this type
of law-firm or a shift of cases from one type of legal practice to
another, this could cause a rise in "poor" (or poorly litigated) suits
and a fall in the plaintiff win rate. Whether this theory is plausible
depends on the transformation of legal services market between 1980
and 2017. A rise in individual litigants and in representation by lower
quality lawyers or lawyers with a high volume legal practice between
1985 and 1995, combined with some market stabilization thereafter,
could conceivably have led to the changes we see in the win rate.
There are two significant problems with the litigant identity
account, however. First, individual plaintiffs tend to bring certain
types of cases (such as employment or personal injury), but the
decline in the plaintiff win rate appears across a wide range of case
types. For example, "commercial" cases, which are more likely to be
brought by institutions and a sophisticated bar, show a declining win
rate over time. Second, this theory appears to require a different model
of lawyer behavior than the one we have assumed so far. As the win
rate declined, one would expect lawyers to stop bringing cases that
they could not prosecute or select these cases out for settlement early
in litigation. But if lawyers are uninformed, irrational, or responding
5 See Scott A. Moss, Bad Briefs, Bad Law, Bad Markets: Documenting the Poor
Quality of Plaintiffs' Briefs, Its Impact on the Law, and the Market Failure It Reflects, 63
EMORY LJ. 59, 63 (2013).
58 Moss's work provides some qualitative evidence for this theory in the
employment discrimination context. Id. at 97-98. Again, we note that this conclusion
depends on the underlying model of settlement behavior and does not generalize to all
reasonable models of the selection of disputes for litigation.
5 See Engstrom, supra note 56, at 1492-1503.
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to other incentives, then perhaps a win rate decline could continue for
ten years without reaching equilibrium.60
1. U.S. Government Defendants
A clue to the potential for litigant identity to affect win rates comes
from data concerning adjudications involving the U.S. Government,
shown in Figures 8 and 9. The sharpest decline in the win rate
occurred for plaintiffs suing the U.S. Government, particularly in
social security cases. Although social security cases do not explain the
phenomenon, since they constitute such a small share of all
adjudications, they hint that there may be something about individuals
suing powerful institutions that may be driving the decline in the win
rate.
Appendix Table 2 shows basis of jurisdiction among the adjudicated
cases that are the relevant population for our win rate analysis. Federal
question jurisdiction accounts for nearly half of all adjudicated cases;
another 25% consists of cases brought by the U.S. Government; and
diversity and cases in which the U.S. Government is a defendant make
up the remaining 25% to 30%.
Cases brought against the U.S. Government exhibited the most
substantial downward trend during the 1985-1995 period. By
contrast, the raw win rate for cases brought by the U.S. Government
did not change much over time - these cases seem unaffected by the
overall trend. Diversity and Federal Question plaintiffs experienced
milder declines in success rate than those suing the U.S. Government.
Figure 8 illustrates the changes.
60 There is some evidence of this being true of new entrants to the employment
discrimination bar and perhaps this was also the case in other areas of the law. See
Moss, supra note 57, at 96-104.
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A. Raw Win Rate B. Est. Year Effect, with Controls
Only three U.S. Government defendant case types have significant
numbers of adjudicated outcomes: Social Security, "Administrative,"
and Prisoner cases. Together, these account for almost 84% of all U.S.
Government defendant adjudications. These case types are not
sufficiently numerous to drive the decline in the pure win rate we
observed in Figures 1 and 2, however. U.S. defendant cases taken
together are only 16% of all adjudicated cases; Social Security cases are
only about 7%, and Prisoner cases amount to only 4.5% of total
adjudications. But they do provide an example of how litigant type is
correlated with different win rate patterns. Figure 9 shows the win rate





The Curious Incident of the Falling Win Rate
Figure 9: Plaintiff Win Rate in Adjudicated Cases, by Quarter of






The most dramatic pattern is the declining win rate for Social Security
cases, from 63% in 1984 to only about 10% by 1996; after that point,
however, Social Security win rates trend back up to about 35%. Win
rates for "Administrative" cases trended slightly downwards in the
1985-1995 period. Prisoner cases actually became increasingly
successful, although they have consistently been much less successful
than other types of cases, as illustrated in Figure 9.
Overall, litigants against the U.S. Government suffered a significant
decline in win rates over the relevant period. This decline does not
drive the overall win rate because of the relatively small numbers, but
could constitute a partial explanation for the "pure" win rate decline
in changing litigant identity. An explanation is still needed, however,
as to why rational lawyers continued to bring losing cases over the ten
year period, especially when (as in Social Security cases) the win rate
at its nadir was so very low.
2. Individuals Versus Institutions
The finding that the U.S. Government fares better than other
litigants leads us to consider whether the win rate decline can be
partially attributed to a change in the type of plaintiffs (individuals or
institutions) bringing cases over time more generally. Some types of
cases such as torts or civil rights tend to consist largely of individual
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plaintiffs suing institutional defendants. These cases also tend to be
the types of cases that plaintiffs lose more often. Theorists have long
argued that individual plaintiffs face more of an uphill battle in
litigation when facing institutions than when the parties are evenly
matched.61 Perhaps the composition of the plaintiff population shifted
towards individuals rather than institutions over this time period in
case types not usually associated with individual litigants.
Although the data currently available does not differentiate by type
of plaintiff and defendant, data about the timing of resolution and
level of judicial involvement indicates this theory is worthy of further
study. We find that win rates declined most for cases in which there
was no judicial action at all before dismissal (as compared with those
cases in which there was an adjudicated motion, for example). This
suggests that some of the reason why plaintiffs may be losing more
cases is that they are not prosecuting them as vigorously as they once
did. Anecdotally, cases brought by individuals are considered more
likely to fall into the category of lax prosecution than those brought by
institutions. 62
This theory differs from the earlier discussion of "poor" cases
displacing "good cases." A dismissal for lack of prosecution does not
necessarily mean that the case is meritless. Other factors, including
economic considerations, poor lawyering, or the economics of legal
practice may cause plaintiffs to fail to zealously pursue their cases. In
cases in which there was no defendant response, we can assume that
the case is not resolved because the plaintiff received information from
the other side that it did not have at the commencement of litigation
about the quality of her case (although the plaintiff may have learned
new information from her own investigation). We find that win rates
decline both in cases that do not involve court action and those cases
which do, suggesting that even when plaintiffs prosecuted their cases
over this period they tended to lose more frequently over time.
We show the decline of win rates at different points in the litigation
using the AO's tracking of procedural progress at termination. The
AO's "Procedural Progress" codes are roughly allocated into two
categories - before and after "the issue is joined." The category
"before issue is joined" means that the defendant has filed no answer
or other motion. Roughly half of all adjudicated cases are resolved
before the issue is joined. Plaintiff win rates in cases decided before
61 Marc Galanter found that individual plaintiffs suing organizational defendants
were especially likely to lose. Contract in Court, supra note 22, at 593, 599; Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead, supra note 22, at 119-22.
62 Interview withJane Doe, District CourtJudge, (July 21, 2017).
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the issue was joined (either with or without controls) track the overall
results quite closely.
Figures 10.A and 10.B use the same methods we adopted earlier.
Figure 10.A plots the raw (unadjusted) win rate by quarter for cases
that terminated before and after the issue was joined. Figure 10.B
shows the estimated year effects on the win rate in adjudicated cases,
with the same set of controls as earlier. Both parts of Figure 9 tell a
story that is consistent with the overall pattern we have observed.
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C. Raw Win Rate, by Procedural Progress
Figure 1O.C illustrates the win rate for cases in which defendants did
respond to the complaint, distinguishing those that close with no
subsequent court action at all (code 3) from those that required some
intervention before closing (codes 4 and 5).63 This disaggregation
63 Code 3 refers to cases decided after the issue was joined but without court
intervention. Code 4 refers to cases decided after the issue was joined by judgment on
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reveals that win rates declined most for cases in which there was no
judicial action at all, suggesting that changing plaintiff identity and
investment in their lawsuits may be a fruitful area for further study.
The decline in plaintiff resources to prosecute cases offers at best a
partial explanation for the 20% decline in the win rate, however,
because the declines are evident across all of the procedural progress
codes. The decline is also driven by cases which plaintiffs prosecuted
and lost. A viable explanation for the decline must therefore explain
the decline in both cases in which plaintiffs invested and those in
which they (apparently) did not.
Importantly, there is good reason for econometric skepticism with
respect to all analysis that depends on procedural progress. Unlike
fixed-in-advance variables such as Nature of Suit or Jurisdictional
Basis, a case's procedural progress at termination is endogenous with
respect to its outcome. That is, the same factors that cause a case to
end "before the issue is joined," rather than after, could plausibly be
correlated with the case's ultimate outcome. These results should be
understood as a way of summarizing the evidence, rather than as a
statement about causal influence. The same is true for the findings in
the next section, documenting changes in the length of case
disposition.
3. Uphill Versus Downhill Battles
The data offer some, albeit limited, evidence that plaintiffs with
"good" cases may have faced more "uphill" battles, and litigated them
longer and with more procedural hurdles, in the period of long decline
(1985 to 1995) than previously. This evidence is consistent with the
individual plaintiff thesis explained above and the theoretical
literature, which posits that individuals are more likely to have a
difficult time prosecuting their cases than institutions.
Figures 11 and 12 plot the median duration of adjudicated cases by
the quarter in which the case terminated. 64 It is apparent from Figure
11 that adjudicated cases won by plaintiffs are closed in considerably
less time than those won by defendants. The median plaintiff win
takes only about half as long as the median defendant win. Moreover,
conference held.
64 Cases with durations of more than 2000 days are extreme outliers and are
dropped in both figures. The same caveat about endogeneity that we raised with our
analysis of procedural progress applies here as well. A case's duration and the party
who prevails are clearly determined by some of the same factors, so the relationship
between prevailing party and duration should not be given a causal interpretation.
[Vol. 52:13711406
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both plaintiff and defendant wins have gotten longer over the past
thirty years, by roughly fifty days.
Figure 11: Median Duration (days) of Cases Won by Plaintiff and
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Figure 12: Ratio of Median Duration of Plaintiff and Defendant Wins,






Figure 12 shows that cases won by plaintiffs started getting longer
relative to those won by defendants around the end of 1984, and this
trend continued through 1995, as indicated by the vertical red lines.
This is precisely the period during which plaintiff win rates declined.
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It is possible that the two trends are related.65 Figures 11 and 12, and
the data on the procedural progress of cases from Figure 10, suggest
that plaintiffs with winning cases may have faced more "uphill"
battles, and litigated them longer and with more procedural hurdles,
in the period of long decline (1985 to 1995) than previously.66
These changes do not in themselves provide an explanation for
either the long decline in plaintiff win rates from 1985 to 1995 or the
stabilization and volatility that emerged after ten years. However, they
do indicate an avenue for further research into the changing nature of
adjudication, of party make-up, or a combination of both, over this
period. With further research, such changes, taken together, might
explain the win rate decline.
D. Changing Judicial Attitudes Toward Plaintiffs, or Procedural
Retrenchment?
A final possible explanation for the falling win rate is that judicial
attitudes towards plaintiffs changed during the 1985-1995 period,
making judges more skeptical of plaintiff claims. This is similar to the
idea that procedural retrenchment (which is sometimes also attributed
to an anti-plaintiff bias) caused the decline in win rates. These theories
can also be related to changes in plaintiff identity, as many of the
procedural changes over the past forty years increased the costs of
litigation, which one would anticipate would have a greater effect on
individuals suing institutions than other types of litigants. On their
own, however, the judicial attitudes and procedural retrenchment
theories do not fit the data very well.
The available data do not allow us to trace changes in decision
patterns of individual judges to compare them over time.67
65 The increased length of plaintiff wins relative to defendant wins could, by itself,
have had a temporary "algebraic" effect on the win rate. As an analogy, think of what
happens to the share of women in all year-i deaths, as female life expectancy starts to
lengthen relative to that of men. As successive cohorts of women start living relatively
longer, they account for a smaller fraction of all annual deaths until at some point the
life expectancy of new cohorts stops increasing. During that time, women make up a
smaller fraction of all deaths in any given year than their share of all births (roughly
one-half) in the year they were born. Similarly, if plaintiff-won cases are taking longer
to adjudicate relative to defendant-won cases, that fact by itself will depress the
plaintiff win rate for a period of time.
66 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding
Accountability, 81 TEx. L. REV. 285, 301 (2002) (describing changes in attitude
towards litigants, especially plaintiffs).
67 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts does not release data with
individual judge identifiers.
1408 [Vol. 52:1371
The Curious Incident of the Falling Win Rate
Accordingly, the judicial attitudes thesis is difficult to either prove or
disprove directly. Still, there is some evidence that the federal courts
began to disfavor litigation in general beginning in the late 1970s. For
example, Andrew Siegel has persuasively argued that the most
reasonable explanation for the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence is its
hostility to litigation. 68 Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang have
shown that the probability that the Supreme Court ruled in a way that
allowed a plaintiff to bring a private enforcement action fell from
around 68% in 1970 to 18% in 2013.69
A variant on this hypothesis is that the makeup of the federal
judiciary changed during the period between 1985 and 1995, so that
judges who were more sympathetic to plaintiffs were gradually
replaced by ones who were less so. If such a change in personnel
stabilized in 1995, that could have given rise to a pattern like the one
we observe. 70 That is, as more plaintiff-friendly judges were displaced,
the win rate might slowly decline, and when judicial personnel
stabilized, the win rate would reach a new (lower) equilibrium.
It is not possible to test this hypothesis with existing data. However,
we can look at the share of all sitting district court judges appointed
by Democratic presidents as a crude first step. The data are graphed in
Figure 13.71 If one assumes that Democratic-appointed judges are
more plaintiff-friendly than Republican appointees and ignores
selection effects, the picture seems broadly consistent with the
evolution of the win rate as depicted in Figure 1. The share of
Democratic appointees peaks in 1981, but allowing for lags in filing
and deciding cases, it roughly matches the drop in plaintiff win rates
beginning in the mid 1980s. And similarly, the share of Democratic
appointees began to rise again in 1992, which - again allowing for
68 See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117-18
(2006).
69 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1574 (2014).
70 We are hedging here because if all parties know about the shift in judicial
attitudes, a Priest-Klein style analysis would predict offsetting changes in settlement
behavior, meaning that the win rate would not move (significantly) in response to a
more defendant-friendly judiciary. Instead, parties would simply settle marginal cases
that would formerly have been plaintiff wins.
71 The data come from https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges, and include both senior
and regular judges. As suggested by Bert Kritzer, one could weight senior judges as
counting for only half of an ordinary judge, but doing so makes no difference. We are
grateful to Professors Christina Boyd and Bert Kritzer for obtaining the data for us and
suggesting how to use it.
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lags - could line up with the stabilization in the win rate in the mid-
1990s.
Figure 13: Share of Sitting District Court Judges Appointed by











Although it is tempting to read Figure 13 as confirming the judicial
politics explanation for the falling win rate, we remain skeptical for
several reasons. First, as we have stressed before, there is no necessary
relationship between win rates in litigated cases and judicial ideology
or a judge's personal decision standard once selective settlement
practices have been taken into consideration. 72 A more defendant-
friendly judiciary could in principle actually cause in a higher win rate
in the selected sample of cases that are litigated.
Second, even if one believes that Democratic appointees were more
"pro-plaintiff" than Republican appointees, it is hard to see how
judicial attitudes could explain declining win rates in case types where
most plaintiffs are institutions or business. "Plaintiff" and "Defendant"
are procedural categories, not ideological ones. So pro-business
Republicans should logically prefer plaintiffs in areas such as copyright
where business are suing individuals? But win rates fell across almost
72 See Jonah Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of the
Parties, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1673-75 (2014); Priest & Klein, supra note 11, at 3-4;
Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 245-48.
73 See, e.g., Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes:
New Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 109-
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all case types, even for copyright and other business-plaintiff case
types.
The procedural retrenchment theory similarly fails to fit the data.
One problem is timing: scholars have pointed out a series of
procedural limitations that were predicted to affect plaintiffs
negatively, starting in the early 1980s in response to the so-called
"litigation explosion."74 But the increasingly hostile view of litigation,
as well as greater emphasis on settlement in the federal courts, began
to be seen in judicial decisions in the late 1970s.7 5 For example, then
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger convened the Pound Conference
decrying the increase in federal litigation in 1976.76 More popular
accounts expressed concern about a rising tide of frivolous litigation,
notably after the decline in win rates was well underway or near its
end.7 7 It is true that Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to empower judges
to manage cases and to close meritless cases more easily.' 8 In 1986 the
Supreme Court decided the summary judgment trilogy, which made it
easier for defendants to bring summary judgment motions.7 9 But
studies show that summary judgment motions were already increasing
in the lower federal courts prior to these decisions.8 0 Similarly, the
11 (1999) (demonstrating that most copyright plaintiffs are firms, at least in the
Southern District of New York).
74 The book by that name was published in 1991. WALTER K. OLSON, THE
LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 2
(1991). Cf. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 353, 360 (2010) (describing various changes in procedural doctrine that
make it harder for plaintiffs to bring and maintain lawsuits).
75 See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1839, 1861 (2014).
76 The proceedings were published in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). See Stephen N.
Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
1155, 1157 (1993) (discussing the proceedings of the Pound Conference, hostility
towards litigation and concerns over the growing federal docket).
77 See generally OLSON, supra note 74.
78 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2) (2018) ("[Tihe court may consider and take
appropriate action on the following matters: (A) formulating and simplifying the
issues, and eliminating frivolous claims or defenses. . . ."). We note - again - that
pro-defendant procedural innovations might lead to a rise in measured plaintiff win
rates (since judges can eliminate "weaker" plaintiff cases), or to no change at all (if the
cases so eliminated are still recorded as adjudicated outcomes favoring defendants).
79 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-54 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986).
80 See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six
Federal District Courts 18-20 (Dec. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
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Supreme Court tightened pleading standards in 2007,81 but it appears
that pleading standards were already more restrictive than mere
"notice pleading" in the lower federal courts long before those
decisions.82 The abrupt change around 1995 is also inconsistent with
the Burbank-Farhang study, which shows a consistent decline in pro-
plaintiff sentiment over the entire period from 1970 to 2013.83 None of
these developments fit the trends we observe in the data, which would
require there to have been significant judicial decisions affecting win
rates across the board between 1985 and 1995, and no such decisions
thereafter.
In sum, doctrinal trends noted by procedural scholars began before
the decline in win rates and continued long after the win rate
stabilized at a new, lower, and more volatile norm. Therefore, these
changes cannot explain the long term win rate pattern.
III. WHAT NEXT?
Given that the usual suspects such as changes in selection effects or
in the makeup of the caseload offer insufficient explanations for the
fall in the plaintiff win rate, we turn to the question of where else to
look for an adequate explanation. We think four types of data would
assist in determining why the win rate shows the pattern that it does
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=914147 [hereinafter Quarter
Century].
81 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).
82 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987,
988 (2003). In a series of cases, the lower courts attempted to increase pleading
standards in civil rights cases only to be struck down by the Supreme Court,
demonstrating that the lower courts were making pleading more difficult in civil
rights cases for years prior to Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (striking down heightened pleading standards for
employment discrimination cases); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (striking down heightened pleading
standards for civil rights cases against the government).
83 All of these scholars were looking at Supreme Court decisions, which may have
less to do with developments at the district court level than many commentators
assume. How much Supreme Court procedural decisions actually affect lower court
outcomes is hotly debated. For example, many predicted that changes in pleading
doctrine would increase dismissals for failure to state a claim. Yet scholars studying
the effect of changes to pleading doctrine on outcomes at the trial court level have
reached disparate conclusions. Compare Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of
Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2015) (finding an effect on dismissal
rates), with William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. 693, 700 (2016) (finding no effect on dismissal rates).
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over the last thirty years: judge identifiers, data on litigant type, data
on lawyer type, and granular process detail (such as timing and
resolution of motions and, to be really ambitious, settlement data).
Such data are either embargoed (in the case of judge identifiers and
motion data) or are not systematically collected at all (in the case of
lawyer, litigant, and settlement information).
A. Judge Identifiers
The current data provided by the federal courts do not include
judicial identifiers.84 If such identifiers were made available, we could
then assess how much of the win rate fall occurred because of the
replacement of one set of judges with another, and how much was due
to declining win rates within each judge's docket (that is, whether a
particular judge's win rate at time t+1 was lower than her win rate at
time t). With a database that also included individual judges' names,
we could test whether win rates depend on the party affiliation of the
President who appointed that judge, for example, and whether the fall
in win rate was attributable to judicial appointments by political party.
Although we are skeptical of the theory that judicial identity drove
the decline in the win rate and subsequent volatility, we cannot rule
this theory out without access to data that would allow us to test it.
We have been told that the AO does not release data with judicial
identifiers in order to protect the system from allegations of bias at the
individual judge level. This is not an unfounded worry. Even if the AO
only provided anonymized judge identification, it would be easy for
researchers to use publicly available data to "reverse engineer" evtry
judge's identity from his or her district and date of appointment.85
That would allow for precisely the singling-out of individual judges
that the AO is keen to avoid. For these reasons, we think it unlikely
that the AO will provide this data to researchers in the foreseeable
future.
84 We note the distinction between judge identifiers and judge's names. The
former require only that each judge in the dataset be given a unique code so that all of
his or her cases could be identified as having been decided by the same judge. The
latter would allow incorporation of background characteristics for each judge.
85 It is important to realize that the name of the judge associated with every
decision is already part of the public record. Thus, the aggregate results (across all
cases) for every judge could in theory be obtained by hand-coding the judge's name
associated with each case. Until recently, that would have been an overwhelming task.
However, advances in web-scraping and big data techniques will soon open up this
possibility, if indeed they have not done so already.
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We appreciate that there are good reasons not to release data with
judge identifiers or names. But there is a tension between protecting
individual judges and protecting the legitimacy of the system overall.
We think that releasing the data to scholars with anonymized judge
IDs, and a requirement not to reveal names or link to external data
sources, could satisfy both concerns. 86 Scholars have obtained access
to sensitive personal income tax data under similar restrictions, and
have generated highly significant research without exposing any
confidential information.87 These agreements are a model for the kind
of data access we would like to see.
B. Granular Process Data (Settlement and Motion Outcomes)
Granular process data, such as settlement and motion outcomes,
could help better test for selection effects. An increasing settlement
rate, combined with an evaluation of settlement outcomes, would
illuminate the role of selective settlement in explaining the win rate
decline. For example, if one could demonstrate that win rates declined
at the same time that settlement outcomes improved for plaintiffs, this
might assuage worries that the system is treating plaintiffs inequitably.
Documentation of settlement outcomes would therefore help in
developing a normative evaluation of the falling win rate. (We note
that to our knowledge, no federal district court carefully tracks
settlement outcomes, although at least one state court does so. 88 )
86 There are still systemic legitimacy concerns that might arise, of course, similar
to the systemic legitimacy concerns raised by the win rate decline. While we suspect
that if researchers discovered that the decline in win rates was in fact attributable to
replacement of pro-plaintiff with anti-plaintiff judges, many would find this shocking,
debunking this hypothesis would increase legitimacy.
87 See, e.g., Jeffrey Mervis, How Two Economists Got Direct Access to IRS Tax
Records, Sc. MAG. (May 22, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/
05/how-two-economists-got-direct-access-irs-tax-records (explaining the procedures
for ensuring confidentiality and the conclusions of the path-breaking research). Even
without such elaborate measures, there is a rigorous procedure under which bona fide
scholars can get access to tax data, under limited conditions for specific purposes. The
IRS has long used "secure data centers" to give access to its data to researchers who
qualify, but only for those who travel to a physical location. See Jeffrey Mervis, It's
Already on File: How Administrative Records Can Help Assess Mobility, Sc. MAG. (May
22, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/05/its-already-file-how-
administrative-records-can-help-assess-mobility. Some data are now made available in
slightly less restricted forms.
88 See Eric Helland et al., Contingent Fee Litigation in New York City, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 1971, 1972 (2017) (describing confidential dataset that contains settlement
amounts and offers).
1414 [Vol. 52:1371
The Curious Incident of the Falling Win Rate
A recent study by Helland et al. showed that settlements in
contingency fee litigation in New York State Court tracked trial
outcomes closely.89 If settlements tracked adjudication outcomes
closely in the federal courts as well, this would be further evidence
against a selection effect. If, on the other hand, plaintiffs experienced
an increase in positive settlement outcomes over the period when they
experienced a decrease in the win rate, this would be evidence of a
selection effect. Settlement information is not available for our data
set, as the federal courts have not requested information on settlement
outcomes from litigants. 90
Combining settlement data with granular motions data would also
help test for selection effects. Suppose that in the past more plaintiffs
prevailed in summary judgment motions and that this led to nuisance
value settlements in which defendants settled primarily to avoid trial.
In that case, the falling win rate would be a reflection of plaintiffs
losing in a way that became more evident over time, a change in what
might be called the visibility of the win rate. Combining motion
outcomes with settlement data would allow us to determine whether
the falling win rate is a reflection of the court system surfacing
information that used to be hidden rather than a true fall in the
plaintiff win .rate.
C. Litigant and Lawyer Characteristics
As noted earlier, if litigant characteristics changed over time, with
individuals replacing institutions as plaintiffs, this could have had an
effect on the win rate. The same is true with changes to the political
economy of legal practice.
To investigate these hypotheses, we would need data that included
litigant type, lawyer type, and granular information about the
resolution of motions. We could then examine the relationship
between litigants, the market for legal services, and the win rate both
across the board, for different types of suits, and at different stages of
the litigation. We can use the nature of suit codes as a proxy for some
types of litigants and lawyers - for example, it is widely believed that
personal injury suits tend to be brought by individuals against
89 Id. at 1982-88 (finding a settlement rate of 76% and that mean recoveries in
settled and adjudicated cases were nearly identical).
90 It is possible, however, that liability insurers retain such data. See Tom Baker,
Transparency Through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion, in CONFIDENTIALITY,
TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIvIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 184, 184-200 (Joseph W. Doherty et
al. eds., 2012).
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institutions and by attorneys working on a contingency fee. But how
many of these litigants are represented by firms willing or able to
invest fewer resources over time? We do not have data on which
lawyers were bringing personal injury cases during this period; some
may have been settlement mills, others may have invested more in
vetting cases. Furthermore, since our data show a declining win rate
across a wide range of case types, case type information is not a useful
proxy for explaining the change in the identity of participants in the
justice system that could have driven the win rate decline.
Data on litigant and lawyer types would help us understand whether
changes in participants in the legal system are the reason for the win
rate decline, and data on how cases are lost or won (at the motion
level) would allow us to understand the mechanisms by which the win
rate is created and their relationship to the economic drivers of legal
practice. Of course, this is not the kind of data that federal district
courts currently collect, and doing so would entail a significant
expansion of their record-keeping activities. Instead of requiring this
information for all litigants, therefore, it would make sense to
randomly sample some fraction of all cases.
IV. WHY ASK FOR A SYSTEMIC EXPLANATION?
Plaintiff success rates in adjudicated cases are a matter of
considerable policy importance. Almost seven million civil cases were
filed in the federal courts between 1980 and 2017. Depending on the
time period, one-quarter to one-third of these ended in some kind of
adjudication. 91 Unlike Las Vegas, however, what happens in court
does not stay in court: adjudicated outcomes inform settlements, and
the underlying behavior by all parties that gives rise to litigation.92
Decisions about how much care to take to prevent an accident,
whether to breach a contract, or how to administer government
programs, are all influenced by parties' assessments of their ultimate
chances of success in litigation. A large and sustained change in the
win rate will ultimately have an effect on primary conduct. We suspect
that even if parties themselves are not aware of the longitudinal trend,
lawyers and other repeat participants in the justice system will
91 Authors' calculations relying on the AO dataset, described supra note 1.
92 See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 234-37 (1982) (settlements reflect outcomes
in litigated cases); Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-Information Model of Litigation 15-
17 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 00-03, 2000) (theoretical model
integrating defendants' primary decisions about level of care with plaintiffs' decisions
to file suit and settlement/adjudication outcomes).
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experience the falling win rate first hand, even if they have not
quantified that change. This is especially true if settlements are
invisible, as they often are, and other parties only know the results of
litigated cases.93
Assessing court output at the individual case level is consistent with
a common law theory of judging. The rule of law has traditionally
been understood to require judges to give, or at least to have, reasons
justifying their decisions at the level of the individual case - hence,
the judicial opinion.94 Every opinion supports a decision, and
decisions are appealable and therefore subject to correction. Judges are
also supposed to be consistent, not only about the reasons they give
but the outcomes they reach.95 This is captured in the aphorism that
like cases ought to be decided alike.
As evidenced by the fact that the system does not track the overall
win rate, the unstated theory of the administration of the federal
courts seems to be that if individual cases are decided correctly most
of the time, and corrections can be made through appeals, then the
system is working well and there is no need to measure global outputs.
We do not know whether individual cases were decided correctly over
the thirty year period documented here, and no quantitative analysis
can reveal the answer to that question. But if like cases are being
decided alike across time, then win rates should remain stable, apart
from whatever variation that can be accounted for by changes in legal
rules or exogenous changes such as a rise in filings of a particular type
93 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for
Lawsuits?, in CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 143,
143-44 (demonstrating how little is known about settlement rates in the civil justice
system).
94 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2018) ("The court should state on the record the
reasons for granting or denying the motion."); Mathilde Cohen, The Social
Epistemology of Public Institutions, in NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 185, 185-208
(Maksymilian Del Mar ed., 2011); Fallon, supra note 14, at 8 (stating that a generally
agreed upon aspect of the rule of law is that "people must be able to understand the
law and comply with it"); Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 6, at 638 (arguing that
reasons are typically "propositions of greater generality than the conclusions they are
reasons for," which means that they serve as a constraint on future decision-making).
Similarly, the most fundamental requirement of due process is that decisions not be
arbitrary. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) ("Since the time of
our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the concept to
be protection against arbitrary action .... ). Not everyone agrees on where to draw
the line, but the determination of arbitrariness must depend to some extent on
whether there is a reason for the decision.
95 See Fallon, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing stability as an element of the rule of
law). Sometimes this value is referred to as predictability or consistency. The purpose
of this value is that it allows people to plan.
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of claim. We suggest that the rule of law requires a change in the legal
standards or other justification for the higher-order phenomenon we
have uncovered.
The federal courts track many other aspects of their work that the
public would care about, including the number of filings and the
median time from case filing to disposition. 96 As a result of
congressional mandate, the courts also track motions pending more
than six months and cases pending more than three years.97 These are
perhaps not as central to rule of law questions as actual outcomes, but
they are relevant from a justice perspective. For example, the Civil
Justice Reform Act shows that Congress cared about speedy resolution
of cases, a value also expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1.98
There is good reason to care about timing of disposition, as delay can
be detrimental to litigants and, in fact, litigants may be willing to trade
off accuracy for speed in some cases. 99
There are also some limited longitudinal studies of the work of the
federal courts. For example, the Federal Judicial Center has studied
changes in filing of motions to dismiss and motions for leave to amend
complaints after major Supreme Court decisions,10 0 changes to
summary judgment practice over time, including changes in the grant
rates of these motions,10 1 and the effect of jurisdictional changes on
class action filings over time.10 2 These types of studies are precedent
96 Federal Court Management Statistics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-court-management-statistics; see alsoJudicial
Business of the United States Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts.
97 Civil Justice Reform Act Report, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/analysis-reports/civil-justice-reform-act-report. The operation of the Six
Month List is the focus of other work. De Figueiredo et al., supra note 45, at 8-10.
98 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (2018) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding").
99 See A.A.S. Zuckerman, Quality and Economy in Civil Procedure: The Case for
Commuting Correct Judgments for Timely Judgments, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353,
386-87 (1994), for a theoretical discussion of the costs of delay as balanced against the
costs of accuracy.
'00 JOE S. CECIL ET AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
CIVIL RULES 1-2 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Motionlqbal2.pdf.
101 Cecil et al., Quarter Century, supra note 80 (manuscript at 6-7).
102 EMORY G. LEE III ET AL., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE
FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE Two's PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF
DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 1-2 (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
preliminary-findings-from-phase twoclass actionfairnessstudy_2008_1.pdf.
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for considering systemic changes in the court system over time and
demonstrate that the courts and the public are interested in the
performance of the justice system in general as well as on a case-by-
case basis.
In addition to the fact that the win rate does not track expectations,
and that there is precedent for systemic studies of the justice system,
there is an additional reason to pursue an explanation for the falling
win rate. Our concern is that there may be "emergent" properties of
the justice system that only an aggregate analysis can expose. We
analogize this to epidemiological studies that detect the increased
incidence of a disease in people exposed to certain toxins. These
studies cannot predict whether any individual will develop the disease,
and indeed most exposed individuals will not become ill, but such
studies are still important to help policymakers determine whether to
regulate aggregate exposure.
Consider the following example: suppose that the universe at time t
consists of 100 cases, which are divisible into three groups. Thirty
cases would yield a plaintiff win by virtually any judge who heard
them, while another thirty cases would generate obvious defendant
wins. Outcomes in the remaining forty cases are "uncertain," in the
sense that a skillful judge could justify a decision favoring either party.
As it happens, suppose that at time t, all forty of the "uncertain" cases
are decided in favor of plaintiffs, yielding a win rate of 70% (i.e.,
(30+40)/100). Now assume that the distribution and number of cases
is constant over time, but that at time t+1, the uncertain cases are, for
some reason, all resolved in favor of defendants. The overall win rate
then falls to 30/100 = 30%.
Crucially, every outcome - both at time t and at time t+1 - is
accompanied by a written opinion justifying its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. At an individual level, there would be nothing to
complain about, since every decision is accurate in the sense that it is
within the bounded set of reasonable outcomes.103 Yet even though
each decision was appropriately justified under the system's rules, we
think that something more is needed. The legitimacy of the system as
a whole requires an explanation for why all of the uncertain cases
were resolved one way at one time and in the opposite way at a
different historical moment.'0
103 Bone, supra note 8, at 1161.
104 It might be said, in the defense of the later judges in this hypothetical scenario,
that since the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof in civil litigation, it is
consistent with impartiality for judges to determine uncertain cases in favor of
defendants. First, this is only true with respect to the burden of proof on questions of
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We stress that we are not suggesting that something of this kind has
occurred in the district court data we analyze. Rather, we raise this
theoretical possibility because it highlights the need for supra-
individual reason-giving. Persistent and otherwise-inexplicable
changes in aggregate outcomes require some sort of explanation at an
aggregate level, even if every outcome is already justified at an
individual level, precisely because of the possibility outlined above.
What phenomena such as the falling win rate require is an
explanation that is consistent with the values that the justice system
espouses, in particular that decisions not be arbitrary (justification)
and that decisions not be biased (impartiality). While we generally
expect stability from the legal system, we also recognize that
sometimes previous decisions do not hold up under scrutiny and new
justifications, understandings, or facts require changes in legal rules.10
Changes in the law, therefore, would provide a valid reason for
systemic changes in the win rate that is consistent with rule of law
values. We recognize that such changes may be controversial, but they
offer a sufficient explanation for the larger phenomenon of a systemic
change in the win rate. Similarly, random fluctuation in the win rate,
at least within reasonable bounds, can be justified by positing that
natural fluctuations in the quality of cases caused the change
consistent with the impartial administration of justice, even if proving
this empirically is challenging. But a sustained and consistent trend
such as the one highlighted in this Essay calls out for an explanation
consistent with the values of justification and impartiality.
What kind of system level consequences require an explanation? The
short answer is system level consequences that are inconsistent with
the understandings of how the civil justice system should work. The
civil justice system is understood to have certain features which in turn
dictate what we predict about the stability of the win rate over time.
First, the justice system is supposed to be impartial. That is, the
identity of the person before the court should not affect the outcome
of the case. This is the reason that judges recuse themselves when they
have an interest in the case before them, for example.
Second, the system promises rectitude. That is, judges are supposed
to apply the law to the facts before them, and the theory is that in
doing so they will impartially determine who wins. Sometimes, the law
fact. It is not clear that this is true with respect to the law as it may easily be the case that
a defendant bears the burden of persuading the judge as to the validity of its preferred
legal standard. More importantly, since in this scenario, the allocation of burdens did not
change, we should not expect a change in the treatment of uncertain cases.
105 See Schauer, Generality of Law, supra note 7, at 233.
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favors one party. For example, where the burden of proof is placed
favors the party that need not meet that burden. So long as the rule in
question is a general rule, known in advance, and the law is not
adjusted based on the identity of the party at the individual hearing, a
substantive legal rule that favors one side over the other is considered
legitimate from a rule of law perspective. If the law as generally applied
systematically favors one type of person over another, this leaves the
law open to a normative critique. The disagreement over whether
heightened pleading standards should be adopted is an example of a
normative critique of law, and this is not different than critiques of
enforcing adhesion contracts or the contributory negligence defense. At
some point, if the perception is that the rules "rig" the system in favor
of one type of party, these normative critiques will implicate the rule of
law. But in general, they are not considered to call into question the
rule of law itself, that is, they are not foundational criticisms. Judicial
determination of outcomes without applying the law to the facts does
call into question the rule of law.
Third, the system promises transparency and reasoned decision-
making. That is, judges are supposed to explain their decisions so that
these litigants and future litigants understand how the law is applied.
This is so that litigants can adjust their primary behavior going
forward. Because the law is not static, there will be moments of
inflection between substantive legal regimes when people may not yet
be aware of the new legal rule. The legitimacy of the system depends
on these inflection points being short-lived. For example, when a new
burden of proof is articulated, litigants are supposed to plan their
cases accordingly going forward.
Under a system where the law is consistently and fairly applied to
the facts, the law is known to litigants, and there are no other social
changes, we would expect that the win rate would be more or less
stable. As legitimate (in the sense of made through the correct
channels, not in the sense of normatively desirable) decisions are
made which change the law, there may be periodic changes in the win
rate as parties adjust to the new legal standards. For example, it would
be reasonable to expect that the plaintiff win rate would dip
momentarily in tort cases if the tort rule were changed from a
negligence to an absolute contributory negligence regime. We would
anticipate, however, that lawyers will learn of the new rule over a
relatively short period of time, and that fewer cases where the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent would be brought, returning the win rate
to its former state.
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One complication of this prediction is the relationship between facts
and law. The law may be relatively clear, but the facts of each
individual case differ. Over the run of cases, however, we would
anticipate that the variance in the facts of individual cases would not
matter to the overall win rate.
There are two types of explanations for the falling win rates: those
that are internal to the court system and those that are external to it.
By explanations internal to the court system, we mean explanations
for change that come from the behavior of judges (or clerks). The
example of judges consistently deciding uncertain cases in favor of one
type of party is an explanation for change that is internal to the court
system. This example raises questions about judicial impartiality.
There is an argument that given an impartial judiciary, cases that
could go either way should go either way. Therefore, the results in
uncertain cases should be evenly distributed across parties. Note that
uncertain cases are not cases without a factual predicate to rule for one
side; they are cases where the court could legitimately rule for either
side. This example illustrates that there can be a gap between the
individual decision-which is valid under this scenario-and systemic
outcomes which are suspect or even invalid.
By explanations external to the court system we mean litigant
behavior and social forces. Take the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA") as an example.10 6 The PLRA made it much more difficult to
sustain lawsuits by prisoners. As one might predict based on common
sense (though not necessarily on formal models of litigation!), the win
rate for prisoner cases fell after the act was passed. To the extent that
this was the result of judges applying the new law with rectitude, it
remains consistent with judges applying the law impartially, even
though it could be criticized on normative grounds.
Now suppose that percentage of prisoners filing suits stays stable,
but more prisoners file suits because incarceration rates go up. This is
not a change in litigant behavior, but rather a change in larger social
forces. It might also cause the win rate to decline, but for different
reasons. This change in society can also be criticized on normative
106 See Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10
(110 Stat. 1321) 1321-66 to -77 (1996); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626 (2018); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 1915 (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1997a-h (2018). See generally Margo Schlanger,
Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (providing an empirical study
describing the effects of the PLRA on prisoner litigation); Margo Schlanger, Trends in
Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 153, 154 (2015)
(issuing a follow up study).
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grounds, but it is consistent with courts applying the existing law
impartially and with rectitude.
Now suppose that the prison population remained the same and for
some reason increasing numbers of prisoners decide to bring lawsuits
that they lose under the Act. The win rate would fall. But that would
not be due to changes in judicial behavior, but rather the change in
the volume of lawsuits that are likely to lose. This is an example of
changing litigant behavior. This change is consistent with rectitude
and impartiality if the judges consistently apply the law across all
litigants; the change is attributable to an increased flow of losing cases
into the justice system.
Finally, suppose that the same number of prisoners bring suits but
they are no longer represented by counsel because counsel fees have
been reduced under the Act. And assume that these prisoners are
unable to adequately pursue valid claims as a result; they simply do
not know how to make their case in legal language which a court will
accept. This could be a problem for the rule of law because the
inability of the litigants to make their case makes it less likely that
judges who depend on adversarial representation of the case will have
the tools to apply the law with rectitude and impartially. If a change in
the win rate is attributable to litigants being too poor to afford
adequate counsel, we might say that this is a systemic problem for the
rule of law, although it comes from outside the court system.
In sum, each type of potential reason for the decline of the win rate
raises different, and valid, normative questions. Only some of these
reasons implicate the rule of law and are under judicial control.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has provided a partial explanation for the fall in the
plaintiff win rate consistent with rule of law values because some of
the change can be attributed to a shift in the type of cases bring
brought. From a systemic point of view this explanation is not
troubling. We think these changes in the makeup of the federal
caseload do not raise concerns from the perspective of the legitimacy
of the court system as a whole or in the quality of the administration
of justice because they indicate a certain stability in the win rate itself
over time within categories of cases. In other words, judges were not
doing anything differently; litigants simply changed the kinds of cases
they brought for reasons exogenous to the system and in a way that
does not implicate its impartiality. The fact that win rates differ
depending on category of case has been widely known and accepted in
the justice system. We think the reason for this is that participants in
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the system believe that this win rate reflects the substantive law and
procedural rules, which provide a justification for differences among
case outcomes. We note that differences in win rates across case types
raises the issue of the normative desirability of any particular win rate
for a given category of case, a topic we do not address in this Essay.107
But it does not raise system-wide concerns with respect to impartiality.
By contrast, a significant change in the win rate across a wide swath
of cases which is not attributable to a change in the composition of
filed cases is troubling from the perspective of systemic legitimacy and
calls for an explanation. For example, if it could be shown that
changes in judicial appointments drove the drop in the win rate, this
finding would call into question the impartiality of judges. While we
do not think this is a likely explanation for what happened, the
possibility needs to be confronted.1os Something changed in the years
following 1985, and we should figure out what it was. We underscore
that it is the fact of unexplained change itself, rather than its direction,
that is the problem; it would be equally troubling if the plaintiff win
rate dramatically increased.
Similarly, if we were able to determine that the fall in the win rate
was attributable to a shift in the type of litigant, that would open
another set of normative questions. Given that the justice system
promises "equal right to the poor and to the rich,"109 empirical proof
that the win rate across all case types depends on litigants' resources
(or other irrelevant aspects of their identities), rather than on the
applicable law or the merits of their suit, should be deeply troubling
because it calls into question the impartiality of the justice system.
And if the decline in the win rate were found to be caused by changes
to the political economy of legal practice, that too would be
problematic. At a minimum, it would suggest significant flaws in the
regulations governing the market for legal services.110
107 Whether a given win rate is normatively good will depend on the substantive
law in question (that is, whether it is good for society to encourage litigants to bring
risky cases), and the relationship between that judgment and the economics of
information (who has it and how costly is it to access) and the legal market in that
substantive area of the law.
108 See supra Figure 13, for a discussion of the role of changes in judicial personnel
in explaining the falling win rate.
109 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2018); ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 112-13
(2017); Richard M. Re, Equal Right to the Poor, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1149, 1216 (2017).
110 See generally GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS
INVENTED LAW AND HOW To REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY (2017)
(discussing how the flaws in the regulation of legal services limit innovation).
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Ultimately, providing an explanation for the change in the win rate
which is consistent with impartiality in the administration of the law
is important to both the moral and sociological legitimacy of the court
system."' If it turns out that the explanation that best fits the data
raises concerns, this provides an opportunity to improve the
administration of justice so that it is in line with our basic values. We
therefore close with a plea to those who administer the U.S. courts to
collect, and to share with researchers, the data that can help explain
the curious incident of the falling win rate. We recognize that giving
researchers more data can itself raise concerns about the legitimacy of
the court system, as well as the privacy of its participants. But at least
with respect to the changing pattern of win rates, the problem has
already been exposed. Given what we already know, the failure to
discover a valid reason for the win rate drop will be just as damaging
to the system's legitimacy as the risks from disclosure of more data.
The purpose of the court system is to produce just outcomes
consistent with the rule of law. To the extent that this goal is not being
met on an aggregate basis, the duty of the participants in the court
system is to repair it to the best of their ability so that the system can
achieve these goals. Refusing to unearth or acknowledge unpleasant
facts stands in the way of remedying them. In the specific case of the
federal court system, it is our belief that the participants in that system
want to do justice and that self-knowledge will contribute to that
imperative.112
111 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1796-97 (2005) (defining sociological and moral legitimacy).
112 "Full wise is he that can himself know." GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Canterbury
Tales: Fragment VII: The Monk's Prologue and Tale, in THE RIVERSIDE CHAUCER 240, 243
(Larry D. Benson ed., 1987).
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: CHANGES IN WIN RATES AND ADJUDICATION
VOLUMES OVER 1984-2016 (BY ADJUDICATION VOLUME IN 1984), FOR
35 LARGEST NATURE OF SUIT TYPES IN 1984
Nature of Suit
Win Num. Win Num. Win Num.
Rt. Adjud. Rt. Adjud. Rt. Adudj. Abbrev.
1984 2016
Overpayments of Veterans 99.5% 23,297 -.- 0
Benefits
DIWC/DIWW (42 USC 57.8% 9,241 28.4% 1,771
405(G))
Other Contract Actions 77.0% 6,784 59.3% 1,991
Prisoner - Civil Rights 3.0% 6,164 2.0% 4,392
Prisoner Petitions - Habeas 4.8% 4,479 2.3% 5,836
Foreclosure 98.9% 4,030 68.6% 1,532
Other Civil Rights 20.7% 3,090 9.0% 3,661
Civil Rights Jobs 18.8% 2,575 8.1% 2,145
Negotiable Instruments 96.9% 2,457 74.8% 127
Recovery of Default Stud. 99.2% 1,940 98.1% 687
Loans
























Fair Labor Standards Act
55.9% 1,877 52.4% 1,112
50.2% 1,505 26.0% 1,711
46.1% 1,455 45.1% 1,183
86.2% 1,393 75.9% 1,430
37.9% 1,393 17.5% 714
50.0% 1,307 54.7% 212
20.7% 1,262 3.0% 1,167
31.4% 1,156 79.3% 347
84.1% 1,062 70.2% 121
56.4% 913 44.2% 172
89.4% 746 87.3% 675
34.0% 744 16.7% 216
57.1% 711 53.1% 81
95.6% 702 71.7% 127
88.8% 663 78.1% 466
14.1% 658 21.2% 4,647
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Other Labor Litigation 55.7% 497
Securities, Commodities, 61.0% 484
Exch.
Other Personal Property 58.2% 407
Damage
Land Condemnation 50.4% 401
Other Real Property Actions 47.1% 329
Medical Malpractice 30.6% 317
Fraud or Truth in Lending 60.0% 310
(1970-1982); Other Fraud
(1983-2008)
Total Adjudicated in These
Categories



































APPENDIX TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF US GOVERNMENT DEFENDANT







































% of Adj'd. US
Def. Cases
45.7%
28.0%
10.3%
7.2%
6.0%
1.8%
0.5%
0.4%
0.1%
0.1%
100.0%
Win
Rate
30.0%
9.8%
21.0%
35.3%
8.7%
26.5%
18.0%
19.8%
21.0%
88.6%
32.4%
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